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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in large-scale language representation models such
as BERT have improved the state-of-the-art performances in many
NLP tasks. Meanwhile, character-level Chinese NLP models, in-
cluding BERT for Chinese, have also demonstrated that they can
outperform the existing models. In this paper, we show that, how-
ever, such BERT-basedmodels are vulnerable under character-level
adversarial attacks. We propose a novel Chinese char-level attack
method against BERT-based classifiers. Essentially, we generate
“small" perturbation on the character level in the embedding space
and guide the character substitution procedure. Extensive exper-
iments show that the classification accuracy on a Chinese news
dataset drops from 91.8% to 0% by manipulating less than 2 char-
acters on average based on the proposed attack. Human evalua-
tions also confirm that our generated Chinese adversarial exam-
ples barely affect human performance on these NLP tasks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Information systems→ Evaluation of retrieval results.
KEYWORDS
adversarial attack, Chinese BERT, human evaluation
1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, the impressive performance of BERT [4] has inspired
many pre-trained large-scale language models [11, 22, 25], which
have obtained state-of-the-art results over many downstream NLP
tasks. Besides its dominant performance in English datasets, Ten-
ney et al. [19] point out that BERT is also effective in ambiguous
languages such as Chinese, whose granularity of words is less well
defined than English [5], because BERT models can disambiguate
information from high-level representation. Moreover, Li et al. [13]
find that in the Chinese environment, using character-based mod-
els (e.g., BERT) is more suitable than word-based models, as the
latter often suffer from data sparsity and out-of-vocabulary prob-
lems.
However, are Chinese char-based models such as BERT robust
under adversarial settings? To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to study this problem in the Chinese domain.While a large
number of studies focus on generating adversarial examples in the
continuous data domain (e.g. image and audio), generating adver-
sarial text examples in the discrete domain is much more challeng-
ing. Current adversarial text generation work [1, 8, 9, 12] is mainly
heuristic and not scalable to Chinese in that Chinese characters
are intrinsically polysemous. Some char-level adversarial attacks
Original Chinese Text: 5名少年抢劫超市杀害女老板被刑拘
(Translation: 5 youngsters were arrested for robbing the conve-
nience store and killing the female owner. )
Adversarial Chinese Text: 5名少年抢劫超市杀害庾老板被刑拘
(Translation: 5 youngsters were arrested for robbing the conve-
nience store and killing the owner Yu. )
Topic Prediction: Society News→ Entertainment News
Original Chinese Text: 网富宝：网富宝是一个帮助用户模拟和
分析基金投资的在线平台，采用交互式可视化方法展现中国基
金市场
(Translation: Wangfubao: Wangfubao is an on-line platform that
helps users to simulate and analyze the investment of funds. It uses
interactive visual methods to display the fund market in China. )
Adversarial Chinese Text: 网富气：网富宝是一个帮助用户模
拟和分析基金投资的在线平台，采用交互式可视化方法展现中
国基金市场
(Translation: Wangfuqi: Wangfubao is an on-line platform that
helps users to simulate and analyze the investment of funds. It uses
interactive visual methods to display the fund market in China.)
Account Prediction: Funds → Other Financial Managements
Table 1: Two adversarial examples generated by AdvChar for Chi-
nese BERT classifiers on the THUCTC andWechat Finance datasets.
Simply replacing one character with another can lead the correct
prediction to a wrong one.
in the English context [6] are shown ineffective for Chinese char-
level attacks, as the sizes of candidate characters increase by two
orders of magnitude and the computational costs surge, especially
for BERT-based classifiers.
In this paper, we propose an efficient Chinese char-level adver-
sarial attack approach AdvChar towards evaluating the robustness
of BERT-based models. Our algorithm adds perturbation in the
character embedding space guided by the gradient and controls the
magnitude of perturbation as small as possible so that only a very
few characters are replaced. We find out that existing char-level
Chinese BERT classifiers are vulnerable under our adversarial at-
tack. Model accuracy can drop from 91.8% to 0% by simply flipping
one or two characters, as Figure 1 shows. Though these adversarial
examples are generated in the whitebox settings, they can transfer
to blackbox classifiers and significantly impair their performances.
In summary, our contributions lie on:
1) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to gener-
ate Chinese adversarial examples against the state-of-the-art BERT
classifiers.
2) We propose a novel and efficient Chinese char-level adversar-
ial targeted and untargeted attack algorithm that is able to handle
thousands of Chinese characters and perturb a very few of tokens.
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Both quantitative and human evaluations demonstrate the effec-
tiveness and validity of our attacks over BERT-based models on
several large-scale Chinese datasets.
2 RELATED WORKS
In contrast to a large amount of adversarial attacks in the contin-
uous data domain [3, 7, 23], there are a few studies focusing on
the discrete text domain. Jia and Liang [8] use handcrafted rule-
based heuristic methods along with crowd-sourcing to generate
valid adversarial sentences and fool the question answering mod-
els. Similarly, Niven and Kao [14], Thorne and Vlachos [20] use
rule-based heuristics to attack specific tasks such as fact verifi-
cation and argument reasoning comprehension. However, these
methods cannot be applied to other NLP tasks [15, 16] and need
human-crafted rules to guide the search. To automatically find the
valid adversarial examples, Ebrahimi et al. [6] propose a whitebox
gradient-based attack method to find character-level substitution.
However, this method is not efficient when it comes to the Chi-
nese language, where there are thousands of common characters
compared with 26 English characters. Additionally, the following
studies [1, 9, 17, 24] consider different strategies to perform word-
level replacement while maintaining grammatical correctness and
sematic similarity.
In addition, while pretrained language models such as BERT [4]
and XLNet [22] have achieved state-of-the-art results in various
NLP tasks, the robustness of these language models are challenged.
Niven and Kao [14] point out that BERT is only learning the statis-
tical cues, which can be broken by simply putting negation ahead.
Jin et al. [9] also finds BERT is vulnerable under adversarial attacks.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Problem Formulation
Given the input x = [x0, x1, ..., xn], where x0 is a special token
[CLS] prepended to every input and xi is a Chinese character, the
BERT-based classification model f maps the input to the final log-
its z = f (x) ∈ RC , where C is the number of class, and outputs a
label y = argmax f (x). Formally, the BERT-based classifier f first
encodes the input
[h0,h1, ...,hn] = BERT([x0,x1, ..., xn)], (1)
and outputs the logits z via a fully connected layer based on the
hidden state h0 of [CLS], which represents the sentence embed-
ding for classification tasks [4].
During the adversarial evaluation, we investigate our attack al-
gorithm efficiency by calculating the targeted attack success rate
(TSR):
TSR =
1
|Dadv |
∑
x
′∈Dadv
1[argmax f (x ′) ≡ y∗] (2)
and untargeted attack success rate (USR):
USR =
1
|Dadv |
∑
x
′∈Dadv
1[argmax f (x ′) , y] (3)
where Dadv is the adversarial dataset, y
∗ is the targeted false class,
y is the ground truth label, and 1(·) is the indicator function.
Algorithm 1 AdvChar: Generating Chinese Character-level adver-
sarial examples
Input: Chinese characters x = [x0,x1, ..., xn ], BERT-based
classifier f : x → z maps input to logits, objective attack function
д(·), embedding matrixMe , constants c and κ , max stepsm
Output: Adversarial Chinese characters x ′
1: Initialize perturbation e∗
0
← 0
2: e ← Mex
3: for k = 0, 1, ...,m − 1 do
4: e ′ ← e + e∗
k
5: // Phase I: Character Substitution
6: for i = 1, 2, ...,n do
7: x ′
i
← argmin([e ′
i
;e ′
i
; ..., e ′
i
] −Me )
8: end for
9: // Phase II: Optimize over the e∗
k
10: L(e∗
k
) ← ||e∗
k
| |p + c · д(x
′)
11: e∗
k+1
← e∗
k
− α∇L(e∗
k
)
12: end for
13: return x ′
3.2 Algorithm
The whole pipeline is shown in Algorithm 1.
Character Substitution Procedure. Due to the discrete na-
ture of text, it is hard to directly utilize the gradient to guide charac-
ter substitution in the character space. However, in BERT, each dis-
crete character xi ∈ R
|V | (one-hot vector, where V is the Chinese
character set) is mapped into a high-dimensional embedding space
of dimension dc via the BERT embedding matrixMe ∈ R
dc×|V |
[e1,e2, ..., en] = Me
[
x0, x1, ..., xn
]
. (4)
.
Therefore, we can search the perturbation in the embedding
space and map the perturbed character embedding back to char-
acters. Suppose we already have an optimal perturbation e∗ in the
embedding space that can achieve the attack goal and is the mini-
mal perturbation.We can choose the perturbed character x ′
i
as the
semantically closest character to the perturbed embedding e ′
i
e
′
i
= ei + e
∗
i
, (5)
x
′
i
= argmin([e ′
i
;e ′
i
; ...,e ′
i
] −Me ). (6)
If we control the perturbation e∗ to be small enough, most char-
acters will remain the same and a very few characters is perturbed
to its semantic close neighbors. In this way, the adversarial exam-
ples look still valid to the human but can fool the machines.
Optimization-based Search. We use the neural network to
search for the optimal perturbation variable e∗. We freeze all the
parameters of the BERT-based classifier f and optimize the only
variable e∗. Following Carlini and Wagner [2], we define the loss
function as
L(e∗) = | |e∗ | |p + c · д(x
′), (7)
where the first term controls the magnitude of perturbation, while
д(·) is the attack objective function depending on the attack sce-
nario. c weighs the attack goal against the attack cost.
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Dataset
Original AdvChar (untargeted) AdvChar (targeted) Baseline
Acc c/κ 5/5 10/5 10/10 5/5 10/5 10/10 (untargeted)
THUCTC 0.918
TSR - - - 0.941 0.945 0.945 -
USR 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.953 0.958 0.958 0.040
edit distance 1.583 1.690 1.718 2.924 3.186 3.045 2.000
Wechat 0.886
TSR - - - 1.000 0.999 0.999 -
USR 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.006
edit distance 2.573 2.599 4.282 6.364 6.376 12.58 3.000
Table 2: Attack success rates on Chinese BERT-based classifier for two datasets.
In the targeted attack scenario, we define д(·) as
д(x ′) = max[max{ f (x ′)i : i , t} − f (x
′)t ,−κ],
where t is the targeted false class and f (x ′)i is the i-th class logit.
A larger κ encourages the classifier output targeted false class with
higher confidence.
In the untargeted attack scenario, д(·) becomes
д(x ′) = max[f (x ′)t −max{ f (x
′)i : i , t},−κ],
where t is the ground truth class.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We conduct experiments on two Chinese classification datasets.
We first perform the adversarial evaluation in the whitebox set-
tings and validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack. We also
explore the transferability of these adversarial examples. The fol-
lowing human evaluation confirms that our generated adversarial
examples barely affect human performances.
4.1 Datasets
THUCTC [18] is a public Chinese news classification dataset. It
consists of more than 740k news articles between 2005 and 2011
extracted from Sina News. These articles are classified into 14 cat-
egories, including education, technology, society and politics. To
speed up the evaluation process, we use the news titles for the
classification. We evenly sampled articles from all classes. We use
585,390 articles as the training set, 250,682 articles as the develop-
ment set, and another 1,000 articles as the testing set to perform
the adversarial evaluation.
Wechat FinanceDataset.This dataset is a private dataset from
the Wechat team, who collect 13,051 subscription accounts in the
finance domain. Based on the account description, they use crowd-
sourcing to classify the account into 11 sub-classes, including in-
surance, banks, credit cards and funds. Each account description
has 94.18 Chinese characters on average. We split the dataset into
the training set (10,000 descriptions), the validation set (1,163 de-
scriptions) and the rest as the testing set (1,888 descriptions).
4.2 Adversarial Evaluation
Baseline.As there are no existing efficient Chinese character-level
adversarial approaches, we propose a simple attack strategy as our
baseline. We first cluster the character embedding by K-means and
generate 1,000 embedding clusters. During attack, we randomly
choose two or three characters and replace each of them with a
random character belong to another random cluster.
Dataset AdvChar (target) AdvChar (untarget)
THUCTC 0.491 0.569
Wechat 0.143 0.552
Table 3: Classifier accuracy after transerability-based black-
box attack on other BERT-based classifiers.
ImplementationDetails.We set themax optimization stepsm
to 100 and use ℓ2 norm in the loss function (equation 7) that is iter-
atively optimized via Adam [10]. We use the pretrained BERT-base
model and fine-tune BERT on each dataset independently with a
batch size of 64, learning rate of 2e-5 and early stopping. We ex-
periment with different attack strategies, e.g., setting the targeted
false class as a specific class or the numerically next class to the
ground truth. In this paper, we choose the targeted attack class
as “entertainment news” for THUCTC dataset and “Fund Account”
forWechat Finance Dataset (when the ground truth label is the tar-
geted class, we switch the target to another random class), which
respectively achieves the highest targeted attack success rate in a
set of ablation studies . More detailed settings of BERT-based clas-
sifiers and adversarial analysis on adversarial attack success rates
are discussed in Appendix A.1 and A.2.
Results.We perform our char-level adversarial attack on BERT-
based classifiers for two datasets in both targeted and untargeted
attack scenarios. The attack results are shown in Table 2.
We can see the untargeted attack can always achieve 100% at-
tack success rate on both datasets, making the model performance
drop to 0% by manipulating merely less than two tokens on aver-
age on the Chinese News Dataset. In the targeted attack scenario,
we can always make BERT output our expected false class on the
Wechat dataset, and achieve around 95% targeted attack success
rate on the THUCTC dataset.
Surprised by the fragility of Chinese BERT, we conduct several
case studies on the generated adversarial text. We conjecture that
Chinese BERT classifiers tend to make predictions based on a cer-
tain set of characters (statistical cues) without understanding the
sentences. Therefore, the adversarial attack can easily succeed by
replacing such critical characters. For the topic prediction exam-
ple in Table 1, “Yu” is a Chinese celebrity name and only appears
in the Entertainment News in the training set. Therefore, the BERT
classifier takes “Yu” as a strong signal to classify the news as the
Entertainment News. Similarly, another wrong account prediction
in Table 1 is because term “qi” is a frequent financial products
(petroleum and gas) used in other financial management accounts.
We also find that increasing the constants c and κ can improve
the attack success rate at the cost of more perturbed characters.
Additionally, because the Wechat dataset has longer text than the
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Dataset Clean Adversarial
Human 0.84 ±0.04 0.80 ±0.06
BERT 0.82 0.00
Table 4: Human performances compared with BERT classi-
fiers in original dataset and adversarial dataset.
THUCTC dataset, it is expected that more characters are manipu-
lated on the Wechat dataset in order to break the statistical cues.
Transferability. The previous experiments are conducted in
the whitebox settings, i.e., we have all the access to the model pa-
rameters and gradients, which is a strong assumption that does not
often hold in the real world. Therefore, we want to further investi-
gate whether our algorithm can still attack BERT classifiers in the
blackbox settings, when we cannot access model parameters. In
this setting, we can attack a blackbox BERT classifier of different
parameters by using the adversarial text generated from a white-
box BERT trained by ourselves.
The transferability-based attack results are shown in Table 3.
We find the adversarial text can still substantially affect the accu-
racy of blackbox models. In addition, the targeted attack success
rate turns out to be stronger than the untargeted attack. Particu-
larly, the targeted adversarial examples on the Wechat dataset can
make the blackbox BERT classifier performance drop from 88.2%
to 14.3%.
4.3 Human Evaluation
To confirm that our generated adversarial examples are valid to
human, we conduct the following human evaluation.We randomly
sample 50 clean sentences and 50 adversarial sentences generated
by AdvChar (untargeted c/κ = 5/5) on theWechat dataset. We give
volunteers two labels: a ground truth label and a fake label. For
the clean sentence, the fake label is a random label different from
the groud truth. As for the adversarial data, the fake label is the
model’s wrong prediction. Both clean text and adversarial text are
mixed together. Ten native Chinese student volunteers are asked
to choose the correct label. These native Chinese students are not
required to be equipped with professional finance knowledge, so
their evaluation results could contain errors and may be not as
accurate as the financial annotators employed by theWechat team.
The evaluation results are shown in Table 4. We find that our
adversarial text barely impacts the human perception, since the
human performance on adversarial data is only 4% lower than the
clean data, in contrast to the huge performance drop of BERT clas-
sifiers from 82% to 0%.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel character-level adversarial at-
tack method to probe the robustness of BERT-based Chinese clas-
sifiers. Our experiments show that existing character-level BERT-
based models are not robust in both whitebox and blackbox set-
tings. While we observe the impressive improvements using the
pretrained language models, we expect our study can encourage
further research into the robustness problems of current pretrained
language understanding models.
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A APPENDICES
A.1 Model Settings
Classifier. Weuse BERT [4] as the classifier for both datasets. BERT is a transformer [21] based model, which is unsupervisedly pretrained
on large Chinese corpuses and is effective for downstream Chinese NLP tasks. We use the 12-layer BERT-base model with 768 hidden units,
12 self-attention heads and 110M parameters. We fine-tune BERT on each dataset independently with a batch size of 64, learning rate of
2e-5 and early stopping.
A.2 Analysis
In this section, we will evaluate the possible factors that will affect the attack success rate.
Norm selection. In the main experiment, we use l2 norm for our attack loss function (equation 7). However, because l1 norm is known
for good at feature selection and generating sparse features, we conduct the following experiments by set lp to l1 and make an comparison
with l2 norm. The experimental results are shown in Table 5 and 6. We find the overall attack success rates decrease when switching to l1
norm. However, given the same set of constants c and κ , we find the l1 attack does change less words.
Table 5: Untargeted attack success rates on Chinese BERT-based classifier for THUCTC dataset. “target” and “untarget” cal-
culate the targeted attack success rate (equation 2) and the untargeted attack success rate (equation 3). “#/chars” counts the
number charcters are modified in average.
Dataset
Original AdvChar (l2 untargeted) AdvChar (l1 untargeted) Baseline
Acc c/k 5/5 10/5 10/10 10/10 10/100 20/20 (untargeted)
THUCTC 0.918
target - - - - - - -
untarget 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.983 0.983 0.995 0.040
#/chars 1.583 1.690 1.718 1.577 1.614 1.884 2.000
Table 6: Targeted attack success rates on Chinese BERT-based classifier for THUCTC dataset. “target” and “untarget” calculate
the targeted attack success rate (equation 2) and the untargeted attack success rate (equation 3). “#/chars” counts the number
charcters are modified in average.
Dataset
Original AdvChar (l1 targeted) AdvChar (l2 targeted) Baseline
Acc c/k 10/10 10/20 30/30 5/5 10/5 10/10 (untargeted)
THUCTC 0.918
target 0.797 0.797 0.898 0.941 0.945 0.945 -
untarget 0.828 0.828 0.920 0.953 0.958 0.958 0.040
#/chars 2.000 1.956 3.280 2.924 3.186 3.045 2.000
Attack Strategy. As we have achieved 100% attack success rate in the untargeted attack scenario, we now focus on the targeted attack
scenario and see which factor contributes to the targeted attack success rate. It is straightfoward to think different targeted attack strategy
will impact the targeted attack success rate, because maybe some classes look "farther" than semantic closer classes. So we tried two
strategies on THUCTC dataset: 1) as used in the main paper, we set the targeted false class as “entertainment news”. 2) we enumerate all
the classes and set the targeted false class to be numerically the next class. The targeted attack success rate is shown in Table 7. We do find
choosing different attack strategy will impact the attack success rate.
Table 7: Attack success rates on Chinese BERT-based classifier for two datasets. “target” and “untarget” calculate the targeted
attack success rate (equation 2) and the untargeted attack success rate (equation 3). “#/chars” counts the number charcters are
modified in average.
Dataset
Original AdvChar (targeted c/κ = 10/10) Baseline
Acc strategy 1 strategy 2 (untargeted)
THUCTC 0.918
target 0.945 0.903 -
untarget 0.958 0.913 0.040
#/chars 3.045 4.543 2.000
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A.3 Chineses Adversarial Examples
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Table 8: Chinese Adversarial Examples generated by AdvChar for BERT-based classifier.
Input (red = Modified character, bold=original character.)
Original Chinese Text: 乌鲁木齐中考答案超出答题边框视为无效
Translation: Wu Lu Mu Qi’s Middle School Examination does not take into consideration answers exceeds the border
box.
Adversarial Chinese Text: 乌鲁木齐中考答案超出答题边躯视为无效
Translation: Wu Lu Mu Qi’s Middle School Examination does not take into consideration answers exceeds the border
body.
Model Prediction: Education News（教育新闻）→ Society News（社会新闻）
Original Chinese Text: 教授称出租车特许经营无法可依提出审查被驳
Translation: A professor said that there was no official laws for the cab drivers to legally run business and proposed to
review the laws but refuted.
Adversarial Chinese Text: 美授称出租车特许经营无法可依提出审查被驳
Translation: An American professor said that there was no official laws for the cab drivers to legally run business and
proposed to review the laws but refuted.
Model Prediction: Society News（社会新闻）→ Stock News（股票新闻）
Original Chinese Text: 15比7！专家一边倒支持热火美球迷却挺小牛
Translation: 15 to 7! Sports Professors all support Miami Heat but American fans vote for Dallas Mavericks
Adversarial Chinese Text: 1568 7！专家一边倒支持热火美球迷却挺小牛
Translation: 1568 7! Sports Professors all support Miami Heat but American fans vote for Dallas Mavericks
Model Prediction: Sports News（体育新闻）→ Lottery News（彩票新闻）
Original Chinese Text: 教师要求表现差学生交2000 元入学保证金
Translation: The teacher asked the students who showed poor performance to pay 2,000 yuan for the enrollment cer-
tificate
Adversarial Chinese Text: 蔚师要求表现差学生交2000 元入学保证金
Translation: The teacher Wei asked the students who showed poor performance to pay 2,000 yuan for the enrollment
certificate
Model Prediction: Society News（社会新闻）→ Education News（教育新闻）
Original Chinese Text: 贝卢斯科尼达成离婚协议每月付35 万欧元赡养费
Translation: Beruskoenida Reach a divorce agreement to Pay 350,000 Euros a Month for Maintenance
Adversarial Chinese Text: 贝民斯科尼达成离婚协议每月付35 万欧元赡养费
Translation: Beminskoenida Reach a divorce agreement to Pay 350,000 Euros a Month for Maintenance
Model Prediction: Politics News（时政新闻）→ Society News（社会新闻）
Original Chinese Text: 《快乐星球》2月11日登陆央视将参与网络春晚
Translation:《Happy Planet》will land on CCTV on February 11 to participate in the Internet Spring Evening.
Adversarial Chinese Text: 《末乐星球》2月11日登陆央视将参与网络春晚
Translation: 《Final Happy Planet》will land on CCTV on February 11 to participate in the Internet Spring Evening.
Model Prediction: Entertainment News（娱乐新闻）→ Technology News（科技新闻）
Original Chinese Text: 债券已处牛市前夜债市翻身6年来最惨一跌结束
Translation: Bonds have been in the bull market since yesterday when the bond market goes up and ends the worst
drop in six years
Adversarial Chinese Text: 债券已处牛市前夜港 市翻身6年来最惨一跌结束
Translation: Bonds have been in the bull market since yesterday when the Hongkong market goes up and ends the
worst drop in six years
Model Prediction: Financial and economic news（财经新闻）→ Stock news（股票新闻）
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